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Abstract:  
 
One of the most persistent controversies in law is related to its completeness or incompleteness. In the 
context of the debate between inconclusive law or the completeness of the law, the main argument of 
the paper is that Hans Kelsen paradoxically converges with Ronald Dworkin in denying legal 
indeterminacy, and albeit from radically different and opposing positions, both of them would arrive 
at the same conclusion in the discussion about completeness or incompleteness in the law: the law is 
‘complete’. Both advocate a position contrary to HLA Hart. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Roughly speaking, the law is complete when within the universe of foreseen (real) and 
unforeseen (possible) cases, all are envisaged by the legal system in their full scope. Fullness 
or completeness is synonymous with ‘regulation’ or ‘deontological qualification’ and its 
consequence on implementation and interpretation is the absence of legal indeterminacy. An 
action or situation is ‘regulated’ –and consequently ‘determined’– in a legal system if there 
is a rule or principle belonging to this system that qualifies the action or system. Thus, law 
is declared to have fullness or completeness when it provides a legal qualification in every 
specific case for every action or situation, real or possible.1 On the other hand, the law is 
inconclusive when it does not contemplate a specific solution for each and every given case.  
 
There are three areas that can provide information on whether the law is or isn’t complete: 
the criteria of legal validity; the rules and principles of law; and judicial decisions. In this 
text I will refer to the question of fullness or incompleteness in relation to the rules and 
principles of law, as well as the influence of the aforementioned positions on legal 
interpretation (judicial decisions). To this end I will take into account canonical legislative 
formulations (rules), but also the implicit content of legislation (principles); in other words, 
both statutory law and the law implicit in statutory law.  
 
As mentioned by Rafael de Asís, the problem under discussion can be approached 
synthetically as follows: we begin with the fact that it’s obviously difficult to believe that the 
legal system has sufficient rules to solve all conflicts, even though the legal system is 
obliged to view the law as something capable of providing solutions to all problems that 
may arise. Fullness is therefore a kind of ideal view of the law to be pursued by legal 
practitioners who should act as if the legal system were complete. This allows us to 
distinguish two senses of the term ‘fullness’ (completeness) of the law: an absolute and a relative 
sense. From the ‘absolute’ point of view fullness is associated with the existence of norms 
that solve, as it were, all problems. From the ‘relative’ point of view, the absence of specific 
norms for solving certain problems is accepted, but (at the same time) so is the existence of 
mechanisms that integrate these problems into the legal system.2 In both senses (absolute 
and relative), the law is full and complete.  
 
In this respect, of the three cases that diminish the occurrence of fullness or incompleteness 
of the law, it is only the absence of a norm with a precise solution and (furthermore) the 
impossibility of finding a solution through various techniques that would allow us to say in 
the strict sense that ‘fullness has deteriorated’. The other two cases (the existence of a norm 
that provides a precise solution to the problem –in a legal dispute–; and the absence of a 
norm with a precise solution, but the possibility of reaching a solution through various 
techniques) would not constitute cases of incompleteness of the law.3 
 
From the above we can infer that the fullness or completeness of the law is assessed 
according to the following criteria: 
 
Firstly, the ability of the rules and principles to cover any actual or possible (future) case that 
presents itself within the legal system. If the rules and principles apply to any actual or 
possible case, they constitute a factor of the completeness of the legal system. If the opposite 
                                                 
1 Mª Cristina Redondo, ‘Teorías del Derecho e Indeterminación Normativa’ (1997) 20 Doxa 180 ff.  
2 Rafael de Asís Roig, Jueces y normas. La Decisión Judicial desde el Ordenamiento (prologue by G Peces-Barba, 
Marcial Pons 1995) 29 and 32. 
3 ibid 32 ff. 
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is the case, the law lacks fullness.  
 
And secondly, for the law to be full or complete, its rules and principles must ‘regulate or 
contemplate in all their scope’ those cases which they cover, without leaving any aspects of 
these cases indeterminate. If this is the case, and the rules and principles extend their 
application to ‘any aspect’ of the cases they relate to, this favours the completeness of the 
law; if they do not, they affirm incompleteness as a characteristic of inconclusive law. 
 
In section two of the paper I will briefly describe the conceptual context, in the sphere of 
legal theory, in which the debate on the indeterminacy or completeness of the Law is 
developed. In section three I will refer to this discussion in the area of adjudication. In 
addition to the above, in sections four and five I will discuss the doctrine of the norm as a 
framework and the thesis of indeterminacy in Kelsen. And I will conclude, as a central 
argument of the paper, that whilst Kelsen paradoxically converges with Dworkin in 
denying legal indeterminacy set out from opposing positions and moving in different 
directions, both of them would arrive at the same conclusion that the law is ‘complete’: both 
theories include a thesis of the completeness of the law against the position of Hart. 
 
2. INCONCLUSIVE LAW OR THE COMPLETENESS OF THE LAW 
 
Approaches to inclusive law or the completeness of the law vary according to the various 
theories of law and of the legal argument used.  
 
Thus, the completeness of law is discussed by contemporary legal positivism with the idea 
that the law is indeterminate because it is incomplete, as it is impossible for it to regulate 
the entire universe of foreseen (real) and unforeseen (possible) cases. Consequently, not all 
legal controversies that judges must resolve can be solved through established law, but 
rather sometimes (partial indeterminacy) or always (complete indeterminacy) the judge 
must use his powers of discretion to resolve a particular case.4 Positivists believe that this 
conceptual framework –which includes a significant thesis on legal indeterminacy– receives 
the greatest support when testing the suitability of legal theory to the practice of law.5 
 
In this debate, an argument that has increasingly gained favour in determining the fullness 
or incompleteness of the law is related to the explanations given by various legal theories as 
to why genuine disagreements occur between jurists in a legal case. As Albert Calsamiglia 
rightly states, one of the fundamental characteristics of the legal profession is controversy; 
jurists discuss and have numerous disagreements about the solutions offered by positive 
law, and yet very few theories have paid attention to the analysis of these disagreements.6 
However, the genuine disagreement between jurists involved in a legal case, in terms of 
legal reasoning, has been explained primarily from two points of view: firstly, from the 
fundamentals of law applicable to the particular case (‘theoretical disagreement’); and 
secondly, from the question of whether or not these fundamentals are in fact satisfied in a 
particular case (‘empirical disagreement’).7 
                                                 
4 cf Marisa Iglesias Vila, ‘Discreción Judicial y Positivismo Jurídico: Los Criterios Sustantivos de Validez’, in 
Roberto Saba (ed), Estado de Derecho y democracia. Un Debate Acerca del Rule of Law (Sela 2001) 92; cf also 
Marisa Iglesias Vila, El problema de la discreción judicial. Una aproximación al conocimiento jurídico (CEPC 1999) 
Chapter I.  
5 cf  Juan Alberto del Real Alcalá, ‘Ámbitos de la Doctrina de la Indeterminación del Derecho’ (2006) 56 Jueces 
para la Democracia 48-58. 
6 Albert Calsamiglia, ‘El Concepto de Integridad en Dworkin’ (1992) 12 Doxa 159 ff; also Albert Calsamiglia, 
‘Ensayo sobre Dworkin’, in Ronald Dworkin, Los Derechos en Serio (Ariel 2005) 7-29. 
7  Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Hart Publishing 2000) 4-6.  
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The main explanation supplied by legal positivism is empirical and is directly related to: a) 
the notion of ‘open texture’ in law; b) the consideration of ‘borderline cases’ in the legal 
system; and c) the significant affirmation of (partial or complete) indeterminacy of the law. 
Borderline cases (doubtful, indeterminate or marginal cases) must be taken into 
consideration, as must those legal cases that involve indeterminacy at the moment of 
application and interpretation, whether in all legal controversies (if it is believed that the 
law is always indeterminate) or only in some of them (if it is believed that the law is 
sometimes indeterminate). In other words, the mechanisms of legal interpretation that may 
be able to solve borderline cases will either never be able to solve them (complete 
indeterminacy) or sometimes will and sometimes won’t (partial indeterminacy).  
 
One legal positivist has been most successful in explaining genuine disagreements between 
jurists: Hart, with his notion of the open texture of the law,8 which arrives at the conclusion 
that the genuine disagreement between jurists is an ‘empirical disagreement’. Thus, when 
jurists must apply a legal term to a particular case, genuine disagreement arises because this 
particular case has fallen into the twilight zone of the area in which the paradigm case of a 
legal term can be applied. This generates subjective uncertainty or doubt (which may lead to 
legal indeterminacy) as to whether the particular case falls within or outside of the area of 
clear application or clear non-application. The result in this case is that the legal term is 
‘indeterminate’ within the legal system, which consequently lacks fullness and is 
inconclusive. The disagreement or dispute is an empirical one because it centres on the act of 
applying (qualifying) a legal concept to a particular case. It is true, as Jules Coleman warns, 
that if we pay too much attention to the genuine controversies between jurists when 
resolving the issue of fullness or incompleteness we may end up understanding law 
exclusively in terms of litigants and judges, and overlook the important role of law as a 
‘guide’ for citizens.9 
 
In opposition to the current positions of legal positivism, the contemporary anti-positivist 
approach, as developed by Lon L Fuller and Dworkin, uses two core arguments to support 
the fullness of the law: a) the radical statement that the implicit contents of the law are 
integrated into the judicial sphere, and that these implicit contents avoid legal indeterminacy 
by producing an ‘ex post determinacy’ of law in relation to any given legal case, whether in 
relation to the explicit law of rules or the implicit law of principles;10 b) the ‘argument of 
controversy’ in response to the question as to why genuine disagreements arise between 
jurists.   
 
The anti-positivist theory of Fuller already provided an argument in favour of implicit law.11 
Fuller also uses other arguments in the field of constitutional law to explain why a theory on 
the sources of law must include implicit law:  
 
(i) because the drafting of any Constitution would be impossible unless the writer can 
assume that the legislator will agree to accept certain implicit notions;12  
 
                                                 
8 HLA Hart, The Concept of Law (2nd edn, Clarendon Press 1994) 124-136.  
9  Jules Coleman, The Practice of Principle: In Defense of a Pragmatist Approach to Legal Theory (OUP 2001) 166 
ff. 
10 cf Juan Alberto del Real Alcalá, ‘¿Certeza del Derecho vs. Indeterminación Jurídica? El Debate entre 
Positivistas y Anti-Positivistas’ (2007) 106 Archiv für Rechts-und Sozialphilosophie, Beiheft  94-106.  
11 Lon L Fuller, The Anatomy of Law (Frederick A Praeger Inc 1968) 44, 48 and 57: in the law or in legal 
provisions there is always a substratum of implicit law.  
12 ibid 63.  
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(ii) because it is necessary to anticipate emergency situations, and to foresee the necessary 
modifications in order to confront such situations;13 
 
(iii) another reason why a written Constitution cannot avoid assuming implicit principles on 
the integrity of the law that cannot be formulated is that the words of a Constitution must 
be interpreted before they can be applied. Fuller talks of the ‘implicit sources’ of law, which 
are derived from the uses, practices, community attitudes and a sort of consensus in relation 
to them, which allows the law to cover the whole range of cases the judge is presented with, 
and to do so to their full extent.14  
 
Given that for Dworkin the legal norm is an ideal more noble than the norm of a legal text, 
only a theory on the sources of law as described above (that includes implicit law) can allow 
the rules and principles to cover any legal case, in such a way that the judge is able to 
determine the ‘demands’ of the law in every legal dispute.15 For citizens, this would make it 
possible for every one of them to have rights and duties in relation to other citizens and in 
relation to their government, even when not all of these rights and duties are codified and 
written down in books.16 This leads him to reject the positivist claim that if a legal dispute 
is not regulated by explicit law it is because the law is indeterminate. From this anti-
positivist approach, a legal system will always have rules and/or principles (identified and 
determined by the criteria of legal validity) that are able to contemplate any problems of any 
case that presents itself to the legal system. This means that any legal dispute can always be 
resolved –and to its full extent– by the law, and that the law is therefore complete.  
 
This position depends largely on the ‘argument of controversy’ as an explanation of genuine 
disagreements between jurists. In fact, modern anti-positivism resolves this issue in such a 
way that, through interpretation, rules and principles can be determined for every real or 
possible case. This is the case even where these rules and principles include imprecise terms 
that may at first appear to generate indeterminacy in their application to a particular case. 
Thus, in contemporary anti-positivism the argument of controversy constitutes a factor of the 
completeness of law in relation to rules and principles, and in the two following senses:  
 
a) In relation to the ‘disputed’ nature (as opposed to open texture) of law, and the Dworkian 
distinction between the concept itself (legal) and conceptions (of the concept).17 One should 
bear in mind that Dworkin, in opposition to the ‘open texture’ nature of law described by 
Hartian legal positivism, claims that the law (rules and principles) is always ‘determinable’ 
(for every case) even when it is ‘disputed’. This means that any problem in law dealt with by 
legal practitioners that is initially indeterminate can always be resolved by the mechanisms 
of legal interpretation and integration.18  
 
There is a prior reasoning that underlies the anti-positivist explanation as to why jurists 
disagree. It is crucial to understand that when the argument of controversy distinguishes 
between a ‘concept’ (legal) and ‘conceptions’ (of the concept) it is not referring to the 
difference between the meaning of a legal term that is part of a norm and its empirical 
                                                 
13 ibid 65. 
14 ibid 58-59 and 66. 
15 Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (2nd edition, Duckworth 2002) 339. 
16 ibid 339-342. 
17 Ronald Dworkin, ‘Thirty Years On’ (2002) 115 Harvard L Rev 1655 ff. 
18Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (n 15) 128 ff; also cf Juan Igartua Salabarría, ‘El Indeterminado Concepto de 
los Conceptos Indeterminados’ (2000) 56 Revista Vasca de Administración Pública 151 ff; Walter Bryce Gallie, 
‘Essentially Contested Concepts’ (1995-1996) 56 Proceeding of the Aristotelian Society 167-198 who 
originally defined concepts that invoke conceptions as ‘essentially disputed concepts’. 
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application (extension) or non-application to a given case. Rather, the distinction is a 
‘conceptual’, theoretical one concerning differing conceptions (of a theoretical/doctrinal 
nature) that each of the parties have in a legal dispute in relation to the term or legal 
concept included in the norm that the legal practitioner is interpreting. In other words, the 
argument centres on the distinction between the ‘abstract idea (or conception)’ and the 
‘specific idea (or conception)’ that the legal practitioner applies to the legal term in order to 
particularise the abstract idea in a given case.19 
 
Therefore, the reason why genuine disagreements occur between jurists is not, as the 
positivists wrongly claim, because the legal terms or concepts under discussion (as to 
whether they should or shouldn’t be applied in a particular case) have an open texture and are 
therefore indeterminate. They occur because such legal terms are ‘abstract’ concepts. And in 
order for the abstract concepts contained in a rule or principle to be applied to a specific case, 
it is not enough to simply observe the facts and subsume them under some applicable 
paradigm; but rather a particular ‘conception’ of the legal concept must be developed in 
relation to the given case. In short, the key to explaining legal controversy is the fact that 
each party to the dispute develops a ‘different conception’ of the same legal term. This is 
where legally controversy truly derives from.  
 
In fact, Dworkin classifies abstract concepts (those that necessarily require a particular 
theoretical/doctrinal conception in order to be applied) as ‘disputed’ concepts. Of course, to 
say that a concept is disputed does not in any way imply that the concept is vague and 
indeterminate.20 In fact, disputed concepts are not indeterminate but simply subject to litigation: 
the parties dispute over their specific meaning in a given legal case.  
 
b) In view of the above, the argument of controversy that states that in legal disputes there is a 
theoretical disagreement between jurists regarding the conception of legal terms, and not 
an empirical disagreement regarding their application, represents, for anti-positivists, an 
important factor in the completeness of the law in relation to rules and principles. In fact, 
according to Calsamiglia, the argument of disagreement between jurists is the Dworkian anti-
positivists most potent weapon for challenging contemporary positivism: if jurists agree on 
which laws are in force, and agree on the meaning of the wording of the law, theoretical 
disagreements about what the law demands (in each case) can and do arise.21  
 
The conclusion is that, from a contemporary anti-positivist –and especially Dworkian– 
point of view, the controversies between jurists are ‘interpretative’ and can therefore be 
resolved through the methods of interpretation afforded by the legal system. Consequently, 
these controversies do not imply any legal indeterminacy.22  
 
3. COMPLETENESS, INDETERMINACY AND ADJUDICATION 
 
The issue of whether or not the law is complete or incomplete has an impact on how judges 
approach the task of legal interpretation. They can either accept the thesis that cases which 
are (partly or completely) ‘non-regulated’, and the rights and duties of citizens that are 
                                                 
19 Dworkin, Law’s Empire, (n 7) 71. 
20 For Timothy Endicott, the ‘abstract’ concepts that Dworkin speaks of are ‘vague’ concepts. See Timothy AO 
Endicott, ‘Herbert Hart and the Semantic Swing’ (1998) 4.3 Legal Theory 283-300.  
21 Calsamiglia, ‘El Concepto de Integridad en Dworkin’, (n 6) 160: Dworkin would suggest that the law is an 
interpretative concept and that texts say nothing in and of themselves.  A particular approach is required and 
that is what positivism has not understood. 
22 Dworkin, Law’s Empire, (n 7) 71, 37-44 and 87-90; and Marisa Iglesias Vila, ‘Los Conceptos Esencialmente 
Controvertidos en la Interpretación Constitucional’ (2000) 23 Doxa 101.  
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argued over judicially, are ineradicably indeterminate, meaning that the law is an 
inconclusive system. Or they can preserve their decision-making capacity through 
interpretative methods and rules of construction that always and in every case resolve the 
initial indeterminacy, meaning that the law is a complete system.   
 
So, according to the anti-positivists, the resolution of a legal dispute is never indeterminate as 
long the judge is always able to identify a unique and correct response within the law. This 
statement that the law is complete is of crucial importance to anti-positivism, as it is the 
final and most important step of the argument that it uses to reject the conclusion of legal 
indeterminacy. It is so important that anti-positivist law is largely reduced to a theory of 
adjudication, a theory of how to construct the judicial decision: it practically views law as an 
argumentative practice, wherein the most important development is the judicial process. 
Naturally this may give the impression that, according to anti-positivism, what makes the 
law complete is not that it is complete in and of itself, but rather that the anti-positivist 
theories of law (particularly its theories of adjudication) act as a factor of completeness (and the 
main factor) while constructing the judicial decision.  
 
A closely related point is that the anti-positivist approach has largely focused on how to 
tackle the hard cases that arise in law, a test bed for theories of law and adjudication in 
observing how the judicial decision is constructed in legal practice. Indeed, Dworkian anti-
positivism largely reduces contemporary positivism to an erroneous ‘theory of hard cases’ 
where Dworkin understands hard cases as those that arise in a legal system when a 
particular litigation cannot be clearly subsumed under a legal norm previously established 
by an institution, (and that in order for them to be settled) the judge has ‘discretion’ to 
decide the outcome of the case.23  
 
However, Dworkin argues that where, in positivism, the judge has discretion to decide the 
outcome of the case, this implies that if one of the parties has a pre-existing right to win the 
case this idea (from the positivist point of view) is no more than a fiction. Indeed, when 
positivism settles a legal case in this way it is creating ‘new rights’: the judge has introduced 
new rights (through the interpretative solution, granting them to the party that wins the 
case), and) applying them, retroactively, to the case.24  
 
From an anti-positivist point of view, the description of the judicial function in terms of 
discretion in hard cases does not give a satisfactory account of what adjudication is or of the 
structure of judicial duty.25 The alternative for anti-positivism is to try to present and defend 
a better theory that more plausibly reflects legal practice.26 To this end, Dworkian anti-
positivism must construct the ‘judge Hercules procedure’: a model of an ideal judge, a 
paradigm of how to construct the judicial decision in hard cases, although equally valid for 
easy cases.27 The Hercules procedure is also a descriptive and prescriptive perspective on 
adjudication, based on the idea of law as an integral social practice that takes into account 
the internal point of view of those who participate in the legal practice; in other words, 
arguments in the practice of law that develop within the judicial process while solving the 
legal controversies that arise therein. 
 
In fact, the Herculean procedure constitutes one of the most important strategies that anti-
                                                 
23 Hart, The Concept of Law (n 8) 124-128. 
24 Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (n 15) 293 and 352. 
25 Dworkin, Law’s Empire (n 7) 37-39.  
26 Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (n 15) 81-82 ff. 
27 Dworkin, Law’s Empire (n 7) 352-354.  
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positivism (in its paradigmatic Dworkian version) uses to provide grounds for the 
completeness of the law, and to counter the thesis of its partial or complete indeterminacy. 
The basis of the Herculean procedure is the conceptual link between law and morality, 
based on a theory of the sources of law that includes both explicit statutory law and the implicit 
content of statutory law. This theory leads to the claim that the legal system has always 
envisaged a ‘correct’ response to every real or possible legal dispute. The result is that the 
judge can settle all cases in law.  
 
As an argument generated by anti-positivism in favour of completeness, the unique 
characteristics of the Herculean procedure which provide an ideal model of judicial decision-
making, do a great deal to vindicate the view of law as a full system. I refer to the following 
characteristics:  
 
(1) Always settling a dispute according to the law; that is, through arguments of principle, and 
not with political or opportunistic arguments (discretional arguments).28  
 
(2) The bivalent structure of the judicial decision, by virtue of which the Hercules procedure 
contains a ‘bivalent’ logical and conceptual scheme for judicial decision-making. The judge 
does not have a third possibility available in which a rule and/or principle neither applies 
nor does not apply, as this would constitute an ‘indeterminate’ response. In anti-positivist 
theories, judicial bivalence is a technical resource for the completeness of the law, even for 
confronting the most complex legal disputes.  
 
(3) The correct univocal response that the law has for any present or future legal dispute.29  
 
(4) The strength of principles in constructing the judicial decision: to bring about a situation 
wherein the law covers all cases (foreseen and unforeseen), the (implicit) principles of law 
play a very important role in the legal argument of the Herculean procedure. The use of 
principles for the completion of law has often been used in contemporary anti-positivism as, 
for example, Fuller’s theory on adjudication when used to solve what he called problematic 
cases.30 
 
 (5) The ‘unlimited capacity’ of the interpretative resources of law as a factor in the 
completeness of law.31  
 
By virtue of these premises, judges perform their duties with the supposition that for any 
legal dispute that citizens bring before them ‘there is some solution inherent in law that is 
waiting to be discovered’. For this reason, the judge ‘must never assume that the law is 
incomplete, inconsistent or indeterminate’; and when it appears to be so, he must realise 
that the defect is not within the law but rather due to the limited abilities of the judge 
himself to discover the solution that the legal system envisages for the particular dispute, 
whether by virtue of rules (explicit statutory law) or principles (implicit law). So the judge 
not only has no room to create law in the performance of his duties, but he must also justify 
what he believes the law to be. He must work to identify the principles that are objectively 
enshrined within the system, and if divergent ideas (conceptions) on these principles exist, he 
                                                 
28 According to the opinion of Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (n 15) 82-83, 90-96 and 111.  
29 Dworkin, Law’s Empire (n 7) 239-240. 
30 Fuller, The Anatomy of Law (n 11) 105 and 144; see also Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (n 15) 81 ff.  
31 Timothy AO Endicott, Vagueness in Law (OUP 2000) 99-100; Spanish translation: Timothy AO Endicott, La 
vaguedad en el Derecho (translated by Juan Alberto del Real Alcalá and Juan Vega Gómez, Dykinson 2006) 159-
160; also, Dworkin, Law’s Empire, (n 7) 44.  
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must decide which of these ideas corresponds to the best conception of these principles.32  
 
Completeness in the area of the judicial decision means that every case compiled involves an 
opinion (the judge’s decision) that maintains that one of the parties has, after the judge’s 
assessment, the best legal argument and therefore wins the case within the legal dispute.33 
Thus, according to this anti-positivist position, if the judges did not follow the Herculean 
procedure as an objective and decisive procedure for resolving both hard and easy cases, it 
would be impossible for them to fulfil the professional duty required of them by the Rule of 
Law to always settle any legal dispute raised by citizens.34 This is the sine qua non for 
satisfying the fundamental right of citizens to effective justice.35 
 
However, two significant kinds of objections have been made to the anti-positivist view of 
adjudication. First of all, is it really possible (and not merely conceptually) to totally eliminate 
the indeterminacy that sometimes occurs in law? Or is this not a useless task, or even a not 
really desirable one, as Hart36 or Timothy Endicott37 claim, for any theory of adjudication, 
given the structure of the law? Another objection relates to the question of whether this 
doctrine can adequately respond to challenges such as the argument of higher-order 
vagueness (for example, the distinction between clear cases and hard cases is not always clear 
cut). According to Endicott, the legal theory of Dworkin –to which the thesis of the 
completeness of the law is fundamental– cannot respond to this argument. 
 
4. THE DOCTRINE OF THE ‘NORM AS A FRAMEWORK’ AND LEGAL 
INDETERMINACY IN KELSEN 
 
According to the criteria discussed in the text, Hans Kelsen’s theory of law, a paradigm of 
legal positivism, should be classified as one of the legal theories that accept the 
incompleteness of law due to its indeterminacy. Traditionally, it has been claimed that 
Kelsen’s thesis of the indeterminacy of law derives from his doctrine of the ‘norm as a 
frame’.  
 
However, I would like to briefly present a number of important points that question this 
affirmation. If these reasons are valid, it would be more correct to say that Kelsen’s legal 
theory contains a ‘thesis of the completeness’ of law than a thesis of indeterminacy. 
Consequently, whilst Dworkin and Kelsen set out from opposing positions and move in 
different directions, both of them would arrive at the same conclusion that law is ‘complete’.  
 
The reasons I put forward can be resumed as one: Kelsen’s legal theory does not really 
contemplate borderline cases, as long as it can settle all present and possible cases ‘according 
to the law’. And it would seem meaningless to ‘accept’ the thesis of legal indeterminacy, 
while simultaneously ‘denying’ the existence of indeterminate cases in law. In my opinion, 
this is precisely what Kelsen’s thesis of law does. I therefore question the traditional view 
                                                 
32 Dworkin, Law’s Empire, (n 7) 337-350. 
33 See Ronald Dworkin, ‘Is There Really no Right Answer in Hard Cases?’, in Ronald Dworkin, A Matter of 
Principle (Harvard University Press 1985) 120-145. 
34 See HLA Hart, ‘El Nuevo Desafío al Positivismo Jurídico’ (1980) 36 Sistema 14 (text from the talk given by 
the author at the Autonomous University of Madrid on the 29th of October 1979, translated by Liborio Hierro, 
Francisco Laporta and Juan Ramón de Páramo). 
35 See art 24 of the Spanish Constitution. 
36 HLA Hart, ‘Postscript’, in HLA Hart, The Concept of Law, (n 8) 251-253. 
37 Timothy AO Endicott, ‘Law is Necessarily Vague’ (2001) 7 Legal Theory 379-380; Spanish translation 
Timothy AO Endicott, ‘El Derecho es Necesariamente Vago’ (2003) 12, translated by Juan Alberto del Real 
Alcalá, Derechos y Libertades 180. 
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that Kelsen accepts the thesis of legal indeterminacy.  
 
Four strong arguments serve to undermine the view that Kelsen’s theory of law contains a 
thesis of indeterminacy.  They are as follows:  
 
4.1The Argument for the Distinction between ‘Individual’ and ‘General’ Norms 
 
From a Kelsenian point of view, ‘a norm is individual if it decrees a once-only individually 
specified instance of behaviour to be obligatory’; when it dictates a unique and individually 
determined required behaviour; ‘for example, the judicial decision’. And ‘a norm is general if 
it decrees some generally specified behaviour to be obligatory’; when it dictates a required 
behaviour determined at a general level.38  
 
From the Kelsenian perspective, the individual norm seems to correspond to clear cases. 
Logically, the Rule of Law provides judges with precise, and largely objective cases, and these 
are used to settle clear cases in accordance with pre-established law. In this type of court case 
the ruling must be made from within the law, in contrast to cases that can only be settled 
discretionally. However, these procedures are insufficient when the legal case has no solution 
within the legal system because it is a borderline case.  
 
If we consider the fact that Kelsen equates the individual norm with the typical situations of 
clear cases, it is probably true that the general norm should correspond to those represented 
by borderline cases. However, this is where the contradiction arises in Kelsen’s legal theory, 
as will now be explained.  
 
4.2 The Argument of the ‘Norm as a Framework’, Based on the Above Distinction  
 
As Hart observed, borderline cases are located in the area of indeterminacy or twilight zone 
of the area in which rules can be applied, for in any legal system there will also be cases that 
are not legally regulated.39 These cases are then indeterminate.40 
 
Borderline cases are characterised as being: 
 
i) ‘marginal cases’, in that they are at the limit between the clear applicability or clear 
inapplicability of the law.  
 
ii) ‘doubtful cases’, in that it is uncertain whether or not the law can be applied to them with 
certainty.  
 
iii) ‘indeterminate cases’ by virtue of the consequence of indeterminacy they produce when 
applying the law.  
 
iv) ‘hard cases’, by virtue of the complexity involved in constructing the judicial decision in 
these indeterminate cases, which are either incompletely regulated or even not regulated in any 
sense by the legal system. This contrasts with the simplicity of constructing a decision in 
clear cases.  
 
According to Endicott, borderline cases can be synthetically defined as those cases in which 
                                                 
38 Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Norms (trans Michael Hartney, Clarendon Press 1991) 7 and 279.  
39 Hart, ‘Postscript’ (n 36) 272-273.  
40 Hart, The Concept of Law (n 8) 126-128. 
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one does not know whether the rule should be applied or not, and the fact that one does not 
know is not due to ignorance of the facts.41 I use the nomenclature borderline cases or 
marginal cases, as this is the most common in legal theories that accept the thesis of 
indeterminacy.  
 
Traditionally, the category borderline cases and the thesis of legal indeterminacy are 
common to positivist legal theories. However, an interesting case arises in this context: 
Kelsen’s theory of law, considered as one of the paradigms of legal positivism. Kelsenian 
legal theory supposedly allows some type of a thesis of legal indeterminacy, but it also tries to 
make it compatible with the opposite thesis of the completeness of the law. In my opinion, 
stating one thing alongside its opposite its inevitably paradoxical. This contradiction arises 
because in Kelsenian legal theory, genuinely incomplete legal cases do not really arise. In 
fact, all legal cases that this legal theory considers can be resolved ‘according to the law’. 
This seems to run counter to the very nature of an authentic borderline case. 
 
The work of completing the law, and of consequently eliminating all legal indeterminacy, is 
performed by Kelsen through his theory of the ‘norm as a framework’. For Kelsen, the legal 
system is a system of general and individual norms that are interrelated in accordance with 
the principle that law regulates its own creation. Every law of this system is created 
according to the prescriptions of another and, ultimately, according to the fundamental 
norm that constitutes the unity of the system.42 In this regard, ‘From a dynamic point of 
view, the decision of the court represents an individual norm, which is created on the basis 
of a general norm of statutory or customary law in the same way as this general norm is 
created on the basis of the Constitution’.43 And, for this reason, the judge is always a 
legislator, even in the sense that the content of his rulings can never be exhaustively 
determined by a pre-existing norm from substantive law.44 
 
Consequently, for Kelsen, a judicial decision ‘is an act by which a general norm, a law, is 
applied; but at the same time it is an individual norm that imposes obligations on one or 
both of the parties in conflict’. So ‘by resolving the dispute between two parties’, what 
occurs is that ‘the court actually applies a general norm of customary or statutory law’. And 
although, as Kelsen claims ‘the court simultaneously creates an individual norm establishing 
a particular sanction to be imposed upon a certain individual’, this creation does not mean 
that the judge is going ‘beyond’ the law. This is because ‘this individual norm can be 
referred to general norms just as the law is referred to the Constitution’.45 From this it can 
be deduced that the legal system can always provide the solution to any legal case from 
‘within’ the law.  
 
What seems to be clear is that the judicial decision in Kelsenian indeterminate cases, which 
are resolved using the notion of the norm as a framework, does not present exactly the same 
characteristics as those typical of the judicial ruling in genuine borderline cases: that is, 
those that do not just present themselves as indeterminate ‘initially’ but ‘ultimately’ turn 
out to be indeterminate. And for this reason they find no solution within the legal system. 
However, Kelsen does not consider this type of case. Moreover, from his point of view, 
when the judge resolves indeterminate (Kelsenian) cases, he is not ‘stepping outside’ of the 
law, but rather reaches a resolution from within the possibilities of the norm, and hence, 
                                                 
41 Endicott, Vagueness in Law (n 31) 31-33 
42 Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State (Transaction Publishers 2005) 124. 
43 ibid 144. 
44 ibid 145, 146, 148-149 and 166-168. 
45 ibid 125-131. 
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according to the law.  
The question that now arises is whether a genuinely indeterminate case can be resolved 
according to the law, because then it would not ‘ultimately’ be an indeterminate case, but 
rather a hard case contemplated by the law (a pivotal case). 
 
4.3 The Argument that the Kelsenian Legal Theory Refutes the 'Theory of Gaps' in 
the Law 
 
Even where Kelsen accepts the notion of the judge as legislator, Kelsenian legal theory 
refutes the ‘theory of gaps’ in the law rejects the indeterminacy of the law: ‘This theory [of 
gaps] is erroneous because it ignores the fact that the legal order permits the behaviour of 
an individual when the legal order does not obligate the individual to behave otherwise’.46 
The theory of gaps is based on ignorance of the fact that when the legal system does not 
impose any obligation upon an individual, his behaviour is permitted.  And where an 
isolated legal norm cannot be applied, it is nonetheless possible to apply the legal system, 
and this is also an application of the law.47 
 
Moreover, Kelsen believes that ‘the theory of gaps in law –it is true– is a fiction; since it is 
always logically possible, although sometimes inadequate, to apply the legal order existing 
at the moment of the judicial decision’.48  
 
4.4    The Argument for the 'Completeness' of the Law and the 'Consistent 
Positivism' 
 
The argument for the ‘completeness’ of the law, which he advocates from a legal positivist 
position that he defines as ‘consistent’, is incompatible with the thesis of legal 
indeterminacy. Kelsen tries to safeguard first and foremost the postulate of legal positivism 
that every specific case must be resolved on the basis of current positive law; and, in his 
opinion, it is essential for a consistent positivist theory of law to show that the system of 
positive law contains this express or tacit authorization (to fill this or that gap).49 But the 
idea that positive law can resolve any type of case does not seem very compatible with the 
thesis of indeterminacy.  
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
For contemporary legal anti-positivism, the law is clearly complete in relation to laws and 
principles, because the legal system is always able to provide complete regulation through 
the interpretation of these laws and principles in relation to any real or possible case. This 
approach argues for the completeness of the legal system through a theory on the sources of 
created law, including explicit and implicit law, from which a solution to the Universe of 
real and possible cases can be provided. Non-regulated cases are seen as gaps, a sort of 
defect of the law, but one that can be fixed through a theory of interpretative adjudication, 
which is always able to provide a correct response to any legal dispute. It follows that the 
completeness of law is one of the theses that most clearly distinguishes anti-positivism 
(especially the Dworkian paradigm) from contemporary legal positivism. On the other hand, 
legal positivism claims that the nature of the legal practice is such that the law is inconclusive 
                                                 
46 Hans Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law (translation from the 2nd German edition by Max Knight, University of 
California Press 1967) 246. 
47 Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law (n 46) 246-247. 
48 Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State (n 42) 149. 
49 Kelsen, General Theory of Norms (n 38) 131-132 ff.  
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as it is incomplete, and supports a (partial or complete) thesis of legal indeterminacy.  
 
This has a consequence on the application of the law and on legal interpretation. For anti-
positivists, completeness necessarily evokes a ‘model judge’ capable of resolving all current 
or future disputes, regarding which the law will never be indeterminate; and even if a case is 
initially indeterminate, this has no significance or relevance to the law, as the case can always 
be resolved through the interpretative methods supplied by the law itself. Legal positivism, 
by contrast, questions the fullness of the law by noting its open texture, the existence of 
borderline cases and the resulting conclusion of legal indeterminacy that gives rise to 
judicial discretion. The inevitable result is that the law is inconclusive as it is incomplete.  
 
The disagreement between the two legal theories seems to reside in the ‘ideal description’ of 
the law given by anti-positivism and the more realistic description of the legal practice given 
by Hartian positivism and by the followers of this doctrine. In any case, both theories 
currently compete with each other to provide the best description of the legal system 
underlying the Constitutional Rule of Law. 
 
However, this account of the differences between positivism and anti-positivism breaks 
down when we consider the thesis of indeterminacy in Kelsen and his doctrine of the norm 
as a framework. If the four arguments we put forward to consider his (apparent) thesis of 
legal indeterminacy are correct, they may put into question the claim that Kelsen’s legal 
theory allows for legal indeterminacy. This is because it does not appear logical to accept a 
system of law that both ‘indeterminate’ and yet ‘without gaps’, as suggested by Kelsen. In 
other words, if we accept that Kelsen’s legal theory allows both one thesis (legal 
indeterminacy) and its opposite (the completeness of the law), we must at least accept that 
Kelsen’s legal theory contains a ‘paradox’ in relation to indeterminacy. 
 
In my opinion, these considerations show that this legal theory is closer to the thesis of the 
completeness of law than it is to the thesis of the indeterminacy of the law. Or at least, they 
seem to seriously challenge the idea that this theory of law is really a thesis of 
indeterminacy. 
 
Perhaps the issue can be clarified by distinguishing between cases that are indeterminate in 
the Kelsenian sense, which are not real borderline cases as they can be resolved within the 
law and according to the law; and cases that are indeterminate in the Hartian sense, which 
can only be resolved by ‘stepping outside’ the legal system, as they consist of cases that are 
really not contemplated by the law, or incompletely contemplated. Only these latter cases 
constitute genuine borderline or indeterminate cases. 
 
It seems that contemporary legal positivism of the Hartian variety understands 
indeterminacy in terms of cases that are ‘un-regulated’ (or at least incompletely regulated) by 
the law. And indeterminacy from Kelsen’s perspective refers, by contrast, to cases that are 
regulated by the law ‘within the norm as a framework’. Therefore, whilst cases that are 
indeterminate in the Hartian sense cannot be resolved by the legal system, the indeterminate 
cases considered by Kelsen can always be resolved by the law and by the system of 
established sources by applying the doctrine of the ‘norm as a framework’. Consequently, 
such cases never ultimately imply the indeterminacy of applicable law. So why is it claimed 
that Kelsen’s theory of law contains a thesis of legal indeterminacy? It should also be 
considered that if Kelsen’s legal theory does indeed contain a thesis of indeterminacy, it 
would be a thesis of indeterminacy that denies the existence of indeterminate cases, which 
seems meaningless.  
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Thus, if this reasoning is valid, it means that the legal theories of Kelsen and of Dworkin 
paradoxically converge in denying legal indeterminacy, albeit from radically different and 
opposing positions. It would also follow that both theories include a thesis of the 
completeness of the law. Both advocate a position contrary to Hart.  
 
